vol.1, No.1 1992 Cybernetics and Human Knowing is an international multi- and inter-disciplinary journal on cybernetics: the understanding of the self-organization and communication of knowledge in human, artificial, and natural systems, and the understanding of understanding, and its relation and relevance to other interdisciplinary approaches such as semiotics.

Cybernetics of Cybernetics 
Second Order Cybernetics

Brier 2010:
Cybersemiotics: An Evolutionary World View Going Beyond Entropy and Information into the Question of Meaning

I have worked through this text with Christoph Bleuler and added some comments and questions:
Cybersemiotics -Boe/Bleu

Cybersemiotics: Why Information is not enough
University of Toronto Press 2008

Boe: Briers 2008 Book was reprinted 2010. I found very important ideas in that book, which I have tried to understand by typing a list of excerpts:

81 Analysing the Possibility of an Information Science
Science, especially natural science has a double role as both the developer of technology and a producer of worldviews (Latour 1993)

We need to develop a more refined and complex understanding of the role of the concepts of reality in relation to our understanding of our role processes of knowing.
Hence, we need a more sophisticated theory of how these identities and differences develop, one that does not resort to the usual naturalistic mechanism, eliminative materialistic theories (Churchland) or functionalistic theories of mind that deny any sort of independent reality to human experiences of first person consciousness - and, therefore, causality as well.
But such a theory must be
supplemented by a theory of signs and signification, as well is by theories about those biological and social systems for which the difference can make a difference, as cybernetics largely addresses the circularity of differences in self organised systems.
I suggest that to go deeper into an understanding of the process, we must analyse the whole
process of signmaking, as Peirce does in his semiotics.

The role of the biology of embodied knowledge
In recent times we have come to realise that there is a fourth, qualitatively different subject area. The fact that our bodily existence is a vital element in the process of cognition as only recently been taken seriously. This has happened, for instance in the evolutionary epistemology initiated by Konrad Lorenz, in second-order cybernetics, in autopoiesis theory, and in Lakoff’s experientialism. It is now realised that embodiment is the foundation for psychic and social-communicative systems.

This development has led us to consider biological systems as separate from physics, chemistry, and the social sciences. As more researchers are suggesting today, biology counts. The ability of living systems to embody knowledge is a unique and qualitatively different area of study from physics or chemistry. The research programme of biosemiotics is an attempt to find biosemiotics on a semiotic and communication approach that goes beyond mechanistic conceptions.

pg. 352 Chapter 9 An Evolutionary View on the Threshold between Semiosis and Informational Exchange
I wish to discuss the question of threshold in the broader epistemological and ontological context of the metaphysics of knowledge systems, as well as in the context of a philosophy of science emerging from biology, cybernetics, and information science. These discussions have brought the relation and conflict between informational and semiotic approaches into focus. I will return later to the discussion about the
semiotic threshold — a discussion that is strongly similar to discussions about whether objective information in nature exists, as claimed by the pan-informational paradigm.
I consider this discussion of thresholds to be situated at the crossroads of the scientific world view, epistemology, and theories of cognition and signification. It is at this point that our conceptions of nature, cognition and the nature of knowledge meet our understandings of the human mind and the relation of mind to matter.
This discussion has been conducted for some time in the context of the informational paradigm. The informational and the Peircean semiotic paradigms are both transdisciplinary, which suggests that
solutions to our scientific problems lie in creating a unifying framework for nature, cognition. and mind.
At present. I can identify five basic significant models that have attempted to explain all of these, from the basic patterns laws, and forces of inanimate nature to the phenomena of life and consciousness. I will briefly sketch these five here and discuss them further in this chapter

pg. 371
9.4 The Peircean Theory of Mind
Although to some, pan-semiotics seems compatible with Peirce’s triadic philosophy, in which the three categories and their internal dynamics are basic, cybersemiotics suggests a more moderate version, one that encompasses physics and information science. In Peirce’s philosophy, the categories work according to the ‘law of mind’ and there is an inner [372] aspect of Firstness (pure feeling) in matter. But one must be aware of Peirce’s special conception of mind and consciousness.

The Cybersemiotic Model of Information, Signification, Cognition and Communication
10.1 The Cybersemiotic View of Cognition and Communication
These social activities generate sign games and eventually, through the evolution of humans, language games.
The construction of a meaningful and informative messages has a prerequisite of autopoiesis, signification, and motivation/intentionality. Only within this triad do selections of information, utterance and understanding become possible.

...a phenomenological-emotional concept is necessary if we are to understand
the production of meaning
...Knowing systems thus unfold from a bio-psycho-social-linguistic conscious being. Their function is to orient us in the world and help us to act together in the most productive ways, but they do not explain us to ourselves.
Peirce's view that we cannot split the concept of mind and matter is very sound and the profound basis from which to begin. I do not see any good reason why the inner world of cognition, emotions and volition should not be accepted as just as real as both the physical world and the cultural world of signs and meaning.